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STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
SCOTT DAVID FERRY, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE MARSHALED EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENTLY INCONCLUSIVE 
SUCH THAT REASONABLE MINDS MUST HAVE ENTERTAINED 
A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT FERRY POSSESSED A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 
The State first claims that Ferry failed to marshal the evidence (Br. of Appellee, at 
14, 15). However, Ferry marshaled the evidence supporting conviction cited in the 
State's brief, in Appellant's brief (Br. of Applnt. at 16-17). The State points to the 
officer's testimony describing the occupants of the car making "a lot of subtle 
movement^]" and acting "nervous" looking over their shoulders as an unmarshalled fact 
(R. 197at 15, 17). It is not at all clear that the officer ever testified that Ferry was 
involved in any subtle movements or looking over shoulders. The officer said, "I noticed 
the vehicle was occupied by four individuals. There was a lot of subtle movement, 
particularly the driver, I -the driver almost looked like he was bending forward, reaching 
down to the floor, and I seen his arms and shoulders kind of moving." (R. 197 at 15). He 
also said he noticed, "they-just the nervous movements, a lot of looking over their 
shoulders seeing what was going on." (R. 197 at 17). Ferry is not identified specifically 
or even necessarily by implication as one having participated in said actions. 
Additionally, even if he had acted thus, the case law cited by the State refers to "furtive" 
movements, not "subtle" ones. (See State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah App. 
1991). The word "furtive" is defined as "marked by stealth; surreptitious." {American 
Dictionary, Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1998). The word "subtle," on the other hand, is 
defined as "so slight as to be difficult to detect" and "not obvious." {American 
Dictionary, Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1998). Clearly the word "furtive" denotes 
stealth, surreptitiousness, and connotes even secrecy, whereas "subtle" suggests 
something slight and unobvious. As such, "subtle" movements are not in same class as 
"furtive" movements and are not at all necessarily supportive of an attempt to conceal the 
syringe as the State suggests. 
The State additionally points to the driver's admission of marijuana possession and 
the discovery of marijuana under his seat as a fact supportive of Ferry's conviction. 
What drugs the driver possessed or didn't possess is not indicative of possession of a 
methamphetamine syringe by Ferry and is therefore should not be considered an 
unmarshalled fact. 
The State next claims that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that Ferry 
constructively possessed the controlled substance (Br. of Appellee at 15-16). This claim, 
however, is not convincing. In making this argument, the State attempts to distinguish 
this case from the case of State v. Layman, 953 P.3d 782 (Utah 1998), affd, 1999 UT 79, 
985 P.2d 911, in which this Court held similar facts were not sufficient to prove the 
defendant's participation in a criminal enterprise. Specifically, the State asserts that 
Ferry's "nervous movements", his close proximity to the syringe, and his knowledge of 
its presence at his feet is enough to distinguish this case from Layman. (Br. of Appellee 
at 18). In many respects, however, the facts in Layman demonstrate a closer nexus of the 
defendant to the contraband than do the facts in this case. 
First, the State points to Ferry's supposed "nervous movements" as evidence that 
he was attempting to conceal the contraband and thus demonstrating his control over it. 
In Layman, however, the defendant, in the process of stopping, jerked the car to the right 
and left, coming to rest perpendicular to the police car, and was additionally described as 
anxious and fidgety, with red, bloodshot, watery, glassy eyes, and under the influence of 
drugs, for which he tested positive. Layman, 953 P.2d at784-85. In the case at hand, it is 
not at all clear that Ferry exhibited any subtle movements or looking over his shoulder as 
shown in the citations above. (R. 197 at 15, 17). However, even if he was, Ferry was 
only possibly described as looking over his shoulder and making subtle movements. (R. 
197 at 15, 17) This is far less telling than the description of Layman as being anxious and 
fidgety, and the extreme driving by Layman. 
Additionally, although Ferry admitted to previously using and preferring 
methamphetamine, he was never found to be under the influence of any drugs, as opposed 
to Layman who was found, at the time of the stop, to be under the influence of the very 
drug discovered in the co-defendant's pouch. See Layman, 953 P.2d at 784, and (R. 197 
at 19, 27). 
Furthermore, in Layman, when the police attempted to search the pouch of the co-
defendant who was repeatedly, nervously looking toward Layman, he shook his head in a 
negative fashion back and forth. Id. at 784. These facts are certainly just as, if not more 
suggestive of an attempt to conceal contraband than Ferry's nervous look over his 
shoulder or "subtle" movements. Therefore, any nervous movements or behavior on the 
part of Ferry was far less culpable and/or connective to the contraband found than was 
Layman's. 
The State also suggests that Ferry's close proximity to the syringe found makes a 
stronger case for constructive possession. (Br. of Appellee at 18). In Layman, the 
contraband was found in a black pouch located around the co-defendant's waist. State v. 
Layman 953 P.2d at 784. This co-defendant, however, was the only other person in the 
vehicle at the time Layman was stopped and, when the contraband was found, was in 
close enough proximity to Layman for her to look repeatedly, nervously at him and for 
him to shake his head when the police were attempting to obtain the pouch. Id. 
Therefore, although the syringe in this case was found at Ferry's feet behind the driver, 
somewhat closer to the defendant than the location of the contraband found in Layman, it 
is not substantially closer especially when considering that Layman and his co-defendant 
were sitting in close proximity to each other in the car previous to the stop, and were 
within close proximity to each other when the contraband was found. 
Furthermore, Ferry was the passenger sitting behind the driver who the officer 
testified was the one "bending forward, reaching down to the floor" with his "arms and 
shoulders kinda moving" appearing as if he were placing something on the floor. (R. 197 
at 15, 18, 29). The officer also testified he didn't know where the syringe was before 
Ferry stepped out of the car, such as closer to the driver. (R. 197 at 34). Therefore, there 
appears to as much if not a greater connection of the syringe to the driver than to Ferry 
because of the driver's actions and proximity to Ferry in the seat in front of him. 
Finally, the State points to Ferry's knowledge of the presence of the syringe near 
his feet as distinguishing it from the facts in Layman. There is ample indication from the 
facts in Layman, however, that he may have been aware of the presence of contraband. 
First, he drove his father and co-defendant to Vernal where they conducted a drug 
transaction. State v. Layman, 953 P.2d at 784. Second, Layman acted anxious and 
fidgety and was under the influence of drugs at the time of the stop. Id. Finally, Layman 
shook his head in a negative fashion back and forth when the co-defendant looked to him 
nervously. Id. This Court found that each of these facts suggest innocent behavior and 
not just the inference of knowledge of the presence of drugs. Id. at 789-91. Furthermore, 
this Court noted that "persons who might know of the whereabouts of illicit drugs and 
who might even have access to them, but who have no intent to obtain and use the drugs 
cannot be convicted of possession." Id. at 787 (quoting State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 
(Utah 1985). 
In the case at hand although Ferry admitted he knew the syringe was there, he 
stated he didn't know who it belonged to and the officer did not question him about how 
long he had known about the syringe's presence. (R. 197 at 20, 34-35). Furthermore, 
there is no evidence that Ferry owned or exercised control over the vehicle and he was not 
the driver. Therefore, although Ferry was aware of the presence of the syringe, such 
knowledge is not sufficient to support a finding that he intended to obtain and used the 
drugs. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Therefore, because Ferry's case is substantially similar to the facts in Layman, and 
is because there is arguably even less of a connection between Ferry and the syringe than 
between Layman and the contraband in that case, Ferry asks this Court to reverse his 
convictions either because his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a 
directed verdict at the close of the State's case or the trial court committed plain error in 
submitting the case to the jury. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 15th day of April, 2005. 
Patrick V. Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
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